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Abstract
Deep Neural Network (DNN) has been showing great poten-
tial in kinds of real-world applications such as fraud detec-
tion and distress prediction. Meanwhile, data isolation has be-
come a serious problem currently, i.e., different parties cannot
share data with each other. To solve this issue, most research
leverages cryptographic techniques to train secure DNN mod-
els for multi-parties without compromising their private data.
Although such methods have strong security guarantee, they
are difficult to scale to deep networks and large datasets due
to its high communication and computation complexities. To
solve the scalability of the existing secure Deep Neural Net-
work (DNN) in data isolation scenarios, in this paper, we pro-
pose an industrial scale privacy preserving neural network
learning paradigm, which is secure against semi-honest ad-
versaries. Our main idea is to split the computation graph of
DNN into two parts, i.e., the computations related to private
data are performed by each party using cryptographic tech-
niques, and the rest computations are done by a neutral server
with high computation ability. We also present a defender
mechanism for further privacy protection. We conduct exper-
iments on real-world fraud detection dataset and financial dis-
tress prediction dataset, the encouraging results demonstrate
the practicalness of our proposal.
Introduction
Deep Neural Network (DNN) has been showing great po-
tential in kinds of machine learning tasks and success-
fully applying in various applications such as computer vi-
sion (Howard et al. 2017), recommender system (Zhu et
al. 2019), and financial distress prediction (Wei-Sen Chen
2009), due to its powerful representation ability. Deep learn-
ing allows computational models that are composed of mul-
tiple processing layers to learn representations of data with
multiple levels of abstraction (LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton
2015). The general structure of a neural network is shown
in Figure 1. Meanwhile, data isolation has become a seri-
ous problem currently, especially with kinds of national data
protection regulations coming into force. That is, different
organizations (parties) are reluctant or cannot share sensitive
data with each other due to competition or regulation rea-
sons. Such data isolation problem has limited the power of
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Figure 1: Structure of a traditional neural network.
DNN, since DNN usually achieves better performance with
more data.
To solve this problem, existing researches adopted cryp-
tographic techniques, e.g., homomorphic encryption (Gilad-
Bachrach et al. 2016) or secure multi-party computation
(Mohassel and Zhang 2017), for multi-parties to train pri-
vacy preserving neural networks. Although such crypto-
graphic based neural networks have strong security guar-
antee, they are difficult to scale to deep network structures
and large datasets due to its high communication and com-
putation complexities. However, in industry, the real-world
applications happened to have two characteristics: (1) h
datasets are large due to millions of data are hold by big
companies, and (2) the neural network structures are deep
so as to learn the patterns in big data. Therefore, efficiency
becomes a main challenge when applying existing privacy
preserving neural networks in practice.
To ingeniously balance the privacy and scalability, in
this paper, we propose an industrial-scale privacy preserv-
ing neural network learning paradigm, which is one of
the shared machine learning algorithms in Ant Financial
(Chen et al. 2018; Chen et al. 2020a; Chen et al. 2020b;
Liu et al. 2020). Motivated by split learning (Vepakomma et
al. 2018), we split the computation graph of DNN into two
kinds, i.e., the computations related to private data are per-
formed by each party using cryptographic techniques, and
the rest computations are done by a neutral server with high
computation ability. To this end, both private data and model
are hold by data holders, and the heavy non-private data
related computations are done by a neutral server. To fur-
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ther protect data privacy, we propose a defender mechanism
when training the model so that the neural server cannot in-
fer the private input of data holders from the hidden lay-
ers. Therefore, our proposal not only preserves data private,
but also has good scalability. We conduct experiments on
real-world fraud detection and distress prediction datasets,
the results demonstrate that our proposed privacy preserving
neural network has almost the same performance with the
traditional neural model.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose an industrial-scale privacy preserving neu-
ral network learning paradigm with defender mechanism,
which not only preserves data privacy, but also has good
scalability.
• We implement our model on decentralized network set-
tings, where computation nodes have their own private
data and they can train privacy preserving neural network
models.
• Our proposal is verified on real-world datasets and the re-
sults show its superiority.
Related Work
We first simply review deep learning models and then de-
scribe two popular types of privacy preserving neural net-
work models.
Deep learning. Deep Neural Network (DNN) has been
showing great power in kinds of machine learning tasks,
since it can learn complex functions by composing multiple
non-linear modules to transform representations from low-
level raw inputs to high-level abstractions (Gu et al. 2019).
Mathematically, the forward procedure of a DNN can be de-
fined as a representation function f that maps an input X to
an output y, i.e., y = f(X,θ), where θ is model parameter.
Assume a DNN has L layers, then f is composed of L sub-
functions fl|l∈[1,L], which are connected in a chain. That is,
f(X) = fLfL−1...f1(X,θ1), as is shown in Figure 1.
Cryptographic based methods. These methods use cryp-
tographic techniques, e.g., secret sharing and homomorphic
encryption, to build approximated neural networks models
(Mohassel and Zhang 2017; Wagh, Gupta, and Chandran
2019), since the nonlinear active functions are not crypto-
graphically computable. These models are difficult to scale
to deep networks and large datasets due to the high commu-
nication and computation complexities of the cryptographic
techniques. In this paper, we use cryptographic techniques
for data holders to calculate the hidden layers securely.
Split neural graph based methods. These methods split
the computation graph of neural networks into two parts,
i.e., let data holders calculate the private data related com-
putations individually and get a hidden layer, and then let a
server makes the rest computations (Gupta and Raskar 2018;
Vepakomma et al. 2018; Osia et al. 2019; Gu et al. 2019).
For example, Gu et al. (Gu et al. 2019) proposed to enclose
sensitive computation in a trusted execution environment,
i.e., Intel Software Guard Extensions (McKeen et al. 2013),
to mitigate input information disclosures, and then delegate
non-sensitive workloads with hardware-assisted deep learn-
ing acceleration. Our model differs from them in mainly
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Figure 2: The proposed privacy preserving neural network.
The middle pink part is performed on a neutral server and
the rest are done by data holders.
two aspects. First, we use cryptographic techniques for data
holders to calculate the hidden layers collaboratively rather
than compute them based on their plaintext data individ-
ually. Seconds, we propose a defender mechanism when
training the model so that the neutral server cannot infer the
private input of data holders from the hidden layers. There-
fore, our model has better privacy guarantee.
The Proposed Method
Problem Description
We start from a concrete example. Suppose there are two
financial companies, i.e., A and B, who both need to de-
tect fraud users. A has some user features (XA) and labels
(yA), and B has features (XB) for the same batch of users.
Although A can build a Deep Neural Network (DNN) for
fraud detection using its own data, the model performance
can be improved by incorporating features of B. However,
these two companies can not share data with each other due
to the fact that leaking users’ private data is against regu-
lations. This is a classic data isolation problem. It is chal-
lenging for both parties to build a privacy preserving neural
network collaboratively without compromising their private
data. In this paper, we only consider the situation where two
data holders have the same sample set, one of them (A) has
partial features and labels, and the other (B) has the rest par-
tial features. Our proposal can be naturally extended to more
than two parties.
Proposal Overview
We propose a novel privacy preserving neural network learn-
ing framework for the above challenge. As described in re-
lated work, DNN can be defined as a layer-wise representa-
tion function. Motivated by the existing work (Gupta and
Raskar 2018; Vepakomma et al. 2018; Osia et al. 2019;
Gu et al. 2019), we propose to decouple the computation
graph of DNN into two kinds, i.e., the computations related
to private data are performed by each party using crypto-
graphic techniques, and the rest computations are done by a
neutral server with high computation ability. Here, the pri-
vate data are the input and output of the neural network,
which corresponding to the private features and labels from
data holders.
Specifically, we divide the model parameters (θ) into three
parts, the computations that are related to private features
on both data holders (θA and θB), the computations re-
lated to private labels on a data holder (θy), and the rest
heavy hidden layer related computations on a neutral server
(θS ). As shown in Figure 2, the first two parts are private
data related computations and therefore are performed by
data holders themselves using secure multi-party computa-
tion techniques, and the rest computations can be done by a
neutral server which has rich computation resources. More-
over, as has been pointed out by literature, attackers may re-
cover the raw input data given the hidden layers of a DNN.
To prevent the neutral server inferring the private input of
data holders from the hidden layers, we propose a defender
mechanism when training the model. Our solution is against
semi-honest adversary, i.e., the corrupted participants will
still strictly follow the protocol but may want to learn more
information. We will describe each module in details in the
following subsections.
Private Feature Related Computations
Private feature related computations refer to data holders
collaboratively calculate the hidden layer of a DNN using
their own private data. Here, data holders want to (1) cal-
culate a common function, i.e., f1(XA,XB), collaboratively
and (2) keep their features, i.e., XA and XB , private. Secure
multi-party computation (Yao 1982) was born to solve this
problem. Mathematically,A and B have partial features (XA
and XB) and partial model parameters (θA and θB), respec-
tively, and they want to compute the output of the first hid-
den layer collaboratively. That is, A and B want to compute
h1 = f1(XA ⊕XB ,θA ⊕ θB), where ⊕ denotes concatena-
tion operation and f1 is the active function.
We propose to solve the above problem using secret shar-
ing (Shamir 1979). The main technique used is secret shar-
ing based matrix addition and multiplication on fixed-point
numbers. Please refer to (Mohassel and Zhang 2017) for
more details. Assuming f1 is a linear active function, we
propose a secure protocol in Algorithm 1. Note that the non-
linear active functions can be approximated by using poly-
nomials or Taylor expansion (Hardy et al. 2017). To this end,
A and B each obtains a partial share of the hidden layer, i.e.,
h1 = 〈h1〉A + 〈h1〉B .
Hidden Layer Related Computations
AfterA and B obtain the shares of the first hidden layer, they
send them to a neutral server for hidden layer related com-
putations, i.e., hL = f(hl,θS). This is the same as the tra-
ditional neural networks. Given l-th hidden layer hl, where
1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1 and L be the number of hidden layers, the
(l + 1)-th hidden layer can be calculated by
hl+1 = fl(hl,θl), (1)
where θl is the parameters in l-th layer, and fl is the ac-
tive function of the l-th layer. These are the most time-
consuming computations, because there are many nonlin-
ear operations, e.g., max pooling, are not cryptographically
friendly. We leave these heavy computations on a neutral
server who has strong computation power. To this end, our
model can scale to large dataset.
Private Label Related Computations
After the neutral server finishes the hidden layer related
computations, it sends the final hidden layer hL to the data
holder who has the label, i.e., A in this case, for computing
predictions. That is
yˆ = δ(hL,θL), (2)
where δ is designed based on different prediction tasks, e.g.,
δ be the logistic function for a binary classification task.
Strengthening Privacy with Defender Mechanism
To further protect data privacy, we propose a defender mech-
anism when training the model so that the neural server can-
not infer the private input of data holders from the hidden
layers. As can be seen in Figure 2, the defender tries to learn
a representation that maps hidden layer to the private input
(features), just as an attacker would do. Given the hidden
layer (h1), the recovered input of A and B are f(h1,θAd)
and f(h1,θBd), respectively. Therefore, to protect the pri-
vate features being recovered, the defender losses of A and
B are
max
θAd
d(XA, f(h1,θAd)), (3)
max
θBd
d(XB , f(h1,θBd)), (4)
where θAd and θBd are the defender model of A and B and
d(·, ·) measures the distance between original input and re-
covered input. With the present of the defender, it becomes
difficult for the server to infer the input given the hidden
layer and the corresponding input. We will empirically study
the effect of the defender on privacy protection in experi-
ments.
Putting All together
Our model consists of the private feature related computa-
tions, hidden layer related computations, private label re-
lated computations, and the defender. The first three parts
compute the output loss of the DNN, and the last part is the
defender loss. Thus, the total loss becomes
L(y, yˆ)−λ·(d(XA, f(h1,θAd))+d(XB , f(h1,θBd))), (5)
where λ is the defender weight, and L(y, yˆ) is designed
based on different prediction tasks, e.g., L be the logistic
loss for a binary classification task.
Learning Model Parameters
The loss function in Eq. (5) is difficult to be solved due to the
complex architectures. We learn the loss function using iter-
ative optimization method via gradient descent using back
propagation (LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton 2015), as summa-
rized in Algorithm 2. Both forward computation and back-
ward computation need communication between A, B, and
Algorithm 1: Data holders A and B securely calculate the first hidden layer using secret sharing
Input: features of A and B (XA and XB) and current models of A and B (θA and θB)
Output: The share of first hidden layer for A and B
1 A and B locally generate 〈XA〉1 and 〈XA〉2, and 〈XB〉1 and 〈XB〉2, respectively
2 A and B locally generate 〈θA〉1 and 〈θA〉2, and 〈θB〉1 and 〈θB〉2, respectively
3 A distributes 〈XA〉2 and 〈θA〉2 to B
4 B distributes 〈XB〉1 and 〈θB〉1 to A
5 A locally calculates 〈X〉1 = 〈XA〉1 ⊕ 〈XB〉1, 〈θ〉1 = 〈θA〉1 ⊕ 〈θB〉1, and 〈X〉1 × 〈θ〉1
6 B locally calculates 〈X〉2 = 〈XA〉2 ⊕ 〈XB〉2, 〈θ〉2 = 〈θA〉2 ⊕ 〈θB〉2, and 〈X〉2 × 〈θ〉2
7 A and B calculate 〈X〉1 × 〈θ〉2 and 〈X〉2 × 〈θ〉1 using secret sharing matrix multiplication, A get 〈X1 × θ2〉A and〈X2 × θ1〉A, B gets 〈X1 × θ2〉B and 〈X2 × θ1〉B
8 A locally calculates 〈X× θ〉A = 〈X〉1 × 〈θ〉1 + 〈X1 × θ2〉A + 〈X2 × θ1〉A
9 B locally calculates 〈X× θ〉B = 〈X〉2 × 〈θ〉2 + 〈X1 × θ2〉B + 〈X2 × θ1〉B
10 return 〈X× θ〉A for A and 〈X× θ〉B for B
Algorithm 2: Privacy preserving neural network
Input: Features of A (XA), features of B (XB), a neutral server (S), and the number of iteration (T )
Output: Trained model (θ) and defender (θAd and θBd)
1 A, B, and the neutral server initialize model parameters
2 for t = 1 to T do
3 for each mini-batch in training datasets do
4 # Forward computation
5 A and B collaboratively learn the first hidden layer based on Algorithm 1 and send the result to S
6 A and B calculate the recovered input by f(h1,θAd) and f(h1,θBd), respectively
7 S calculates the rest hidden layers by hL = f(hl,θS)
8 S sends hL back to A
9 A makes predictions by Eq. (2)
10 # Backward computation
11 Update model parameters θ, including θA, θB , θS , and θy , using the gradient ∆θEq. (5)
12 Update defender parameters θd using the gradient ∆θAdEq. (3) and ∆θBdEq. (4)
13 end
14 end
15 return Trained model (θ) and defender (θAd and θBd)
the server, in a decentralized manner. During training, all the
private data (XA, XB , and y) and private data related model
parameters (θA, θB , and θy) are kept by data holders. There-
fore, data privacy is kept to a large extent.
It is worth noticed that our proposal can be generalized to
the situations that the data holders collaboratively calculate
i (1 ≤ i ≤ L) hidden layers instead of the first hidden layer
only. Therefore, the existing method (Mohassel and Zhang
2017) is one of our special cases, i.e., A and B collabora-
tively calculate all the neural networks using secure multi-
party computation techniques, without the neutral server.
Implementation
Communication and computation are two key parts of the
decentralized implementation. We will describe our solution
in details.
Communication. The communication includes two parts,
the communication between data holder A and data holder
B, and the communication between both data holders and
server. We adopt Google’s gRPC protocol1 to make con-
nection and exchange data between server and data holders.
Before training, we configure detailed parameters for server
and data holders, such as IP addresses, gateways, and dataset
locations. At the beginning of the training, server and data
holders shake hands to build connection. After that, they ex-
change data to finish model training following Algorithm 2.
Computation. The computation are mainly in two parts, i.e.,
the computations by data holders and the computations by
server. First, we implement the computations by data hold-
ers using Python by ourselves. Second, for the heavy com-
putations by server, we choose TensorFlow2 as backend to
perform forward and backward computations. Note that our
proposal can be easily implemented by using other deep
learning platforms such as PyTorch.
1https://grpc.io/
2https://www.tensorflow.org/
Table 1: Comparison results on two datasets in terms of AUC
AUC NN P2N2
Fraud Detection 0.9270 0.9231
Financial Distress 0.9379 0.9314
Empirical Study
Experimental Settings
Datasets. To test the effectiveness of our proposed model,
we choose two public benchmark datasets from Kaggle, both
of which are binary classification tasks. The first one is a
fraud detection dataset (Dal Pozzolo et al. 2014), where
there are 28 features and 284,807 transactions. The other
one is financial distress dataset, where there are 85 features
and 3,672 transactions. After we encode the categorical fea-
tures, there are 556 features in total. We assume these fea-
tures are hold by two parties, and each of them has equal
partial features. Moreover, we randomly split the fraud de-
tection dataset into two parts: 80% as training dataset and the
rest as test dataset. We also randomly split the financial dis-
tress dataset into 70% and 30%, since the test dataset needs
more samples. We repeat experiments five times and report
their average results.
Metrics. We adopt Area Under the receiver operating char-
acteristic curve (AUC) as the evaluation metric, since both
datasets are binary classification tasks. In practice, AUC is
equivalent to the probability that the classifier will rank a
randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly
chosen negative instance, and therefore, the higher the bet-
ter.
Hyper-parameters. For the Fraud detection dataset, we use
a multi-layer perception with 2 hidden layers whose dimen-
sions are [8,8]. We choose Sigmoid as the activation func-
tion (Han and Moraga 1995) and use gradient descent as the
optimizer. We set the learning rate to 0.001. For the Finan-
cial distress dataset, we use a multi-layer perception with 3
hidden layers with dimensions [400, 16, 8], we choose Relu
as the activation function (H.R.Hahnloser et al. 2000) in the
last layer and Sigmoid function in the other layers, use gra-
dient descent as the optimizer, and set the learning rate to
0.006.
Comparison Results
To study the effectiveness of our proposed Privacy Preserv-
ing Neural Network (P2N2), we compare it with the tra-
ditional neural network (NN) and report the AUC perfor-
mances on both datasets in Table 1, where we set the de-
fender weight λ = 0. From it, we can see that P2N2 achieves
almost the same prediction performance as NN, which is
consistent with the exiting research (Mohassel and Zhang
2017). Besides, we show the average training loss and av-
erage test loss w.r.t the iteration on two datasets in Figure 3
and Figure 4, respectively, where we can see that P2N2 con-
verges steadily without over-fitting. The results demonstrate
the practicalness of our proposed model.
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Figure 3: Average loss of P2N2 on fraud detection dataset.
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Figure 4: Average loss of P2N2 on financial distress dataset.
Efficiency Results
We now study the efficiency of our proposed P2N2, includ-
ing the comparison of P2N2 and NN, the running time of
P2N2 with different training data size and bandwidth.
Comparison of training time. First, to study the efficiency
of (P2N2), we compare the training time of P2N2 and NN on
both datasets. Note that P2N2 is implemented on three PCs
which are used as the server and the data-holders in Local
Area Network (LAN), and we currently ignore the commu-
nication delay between data holders and server. The results
are summarized in Table 2, where we set batch size to 5000.
From it, we find that P2N2 is 70× slower than NN on the
fraud detection dataset and 240× slower on the financial dis-
tress dataset. This is because the first hidden layer is calcu-
lated by using secret sharing technique instead of plaintext
computations, which takes extra communication time, and
the first layer dimension on the fraud detection dataset is
smaller than that on the financial distress dataset. The results
indicate that if all the hidden layers are computed using se-
cure multi-party computation techniques, similar as the ex-
isting privacy preserving neural networks, the running time
will be much longer than our proposal (depend on the depth
of the hidden layers).
Running time with different bandwidth. Second, we study
the training time of P2N2 on the fraud detection dataset by
varying network bandwidth. The result is shown in Figure
5. From it, we find that with the increase of network band-
width, the training time of P2N2 first rapidly decreases and
then tends to be stable. The result indicates that the effi-
ciency of our proposed P2N2 heavily relies on the network
status.
Running time with different data size. Furthermore, we
study the running time of P2N2 with different data size,
where fix the network bandwidth to 100 M/bps. We do this
Table 2: Comparison of training time (in seconds) on both
datasets
Training time NN P2N2
Fraud detection 21.52 1478.32
Financial distress 5.07 1196.67
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Figure 5: Running time of P2N2 with different bandwidth.
by varying the proportion of training data size using the
fraud detection dataset, and report the running time of P2N2
in Figure 6. From it, we find that the running time of P2N2
scales linearly with the training data size. The results indi-
cate that our proposed P2N2 can be scale to large dataset.
Effect of Defender
We finally study the effects of the defender on both model
accuracy and its privacy preserving ability.
Influence on accuracy. We first vary the defender weight
λ in {10−5, 10−4, ..., 10−1} and study its influence on
our model performance, where we use the fraud detection
dataset. We report the results in Figure 8. Note that λ = 0
indicates the absence of such a defender. We observe that,
with the increase of λ, the accuracy of P2N2 first slightly
increases and then quickly decreases. This is because, the
objective function in Eq. (5) has two parts, i.e., the cross-
entropy loss that determines model accuracy and the de-
fender loss which determines the privacy preserving ability,
and they are balanced by λ. When λ is a small value (but big-
ger than 0), it works like a penalty term which prevents the
model from overfitting to a certain extent. However, when
λ is too big, P2N2 pays more attention to the defender loss
rather than the cross-entropy loss. Therefore, the accuracy
starts to decrease quickly.
Influence on privacy preserving ability. Second, to vi-
sually demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed de-
fender strategy, we conduct the following experiments on the
MNIST dataset—a handwritten digits classification dataset
(LeCun 1998), where each private input record is a hand-
written digit from 0 to 9. During private input recovery ex-
periments, we assume a serious private information leakage
situation, i.e., the neutral server obtains some of the pri-
vate input and the corresponding hidden layer of the training
dataset. Based on these leaked information, the server can
learn an attacker that maps the hidden layer to private input.
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Figure 6: Running time of P2N2 with different datasize.
After it, the attacker can easily recover the input of other
records given their hidden layers.
We compare the recovery result with and without the de-
fender. We use a three-layer fully-connected neural network,
i.e., a multi-layer perception, as the defender. The network
structure of the defender is (728, 512, 128, 10), where 728
is the dimension of each handwritten digit, 512 and 128
are hidden layer dimensions, and 10 is the output dimen-
sion (classification number). During experiments, we as-
sume two data holders have evenly partial features of a digit.
We choose Relu (LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton 2015) as the
active function, mean squared error as the distant function
d(·, ·) in Eq. (5), Adam (Kingma and Ba 2014) as the opti-
mizer, and set learning rate to 0.01.
We report the input recovery result in Figure 7, where (a)
is the randomly selected original handwritten digits, (b) and
(c) are the corresponding recovered results with and with-
out the defender, respectively. We set the defender weight
λ = 100 on MNIST dataset, since the attack loss is small
comparing with that on fraud detection dataset. From it, we
can clearly see that, with the presence of the defender, it be-
comes more difficult to recognize the recovered digits. The
results indicate that the defender mechanism can effectively
preventing the server from recovering the private input of
data holders.
Note that one can still make a good guess on the recov-
ered digits from Figure 7 (C), even with the defender mech-
anism. This is because, in our experiments, we assumed that
the neutral server has obtained some private input from data
holders. This is quite serious data leakage situation and is
very difficult to appear in practice, since these private input
are hold by different data holders. Nevertheless, our experi-
ments demonstrated the effectiveness of the defender mech-
anism.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a privacy preserving neural net-
work learning paradigm that can scale to large datasets. Our
motivation is to split the computation graph of DNN into
two parts, i.e., the computations related to private data are
performed by data holders using cryptographical techniques,
and the rest of the computations are done by a neutral server
with high computation ability. Our model achieved promis-
(a) Original input (b) Without defender (c) With defender
Figure 7: Private input recovery results on MNIST dataset. (a) is the randomly selected original handwritten digits, (b) is the
corresponding recovered result by the server without the presence of the defender, and (c) is the recovered result by the server
but with the presence of the defender on data holders.
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Figure 8: Effect of defender weight λ on P2N2.
ing results on real-world fraud detection dataset and finan-
cial distress dataset. In the future, we would like to deploy
our proposal in real-world applications in Ant Financial.
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